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AT THE CROSSROADS OF LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE: IS CHARGING A BATTERED
MOTHER WITH FAILURE TO PROTECT HER
CHILD AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHEN
HER CHILD WITNESSES DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE?
Melissa A. Trepiccione*
INTRODUCTION
Sharwline Nicholson' first became a victim of domestic violence one
winter afternoon while her infant daughter was asleep and her son was
in school. Claude Barnett, the father of her daughter Destinee,
arrived at Sharwline's apartment in a jealous rage. While throwing
objects throughout the house, Claude kicked, beat, and severely
assaulted Sharwline, leaving her with a broken arm. Sharwline
remained overnight in the hospital while her cousin cared for the
children. Though separated from Claude, and never before a victim
of domestic violence, Sharwline lay in a hospital bed while child
welfare caseworkers removed six-year-old Kendall and baby Destinee
from Sharwline's cousin. Sharwline was charged with neglect, even
though her children had not witnessed domestic violence prior to or
during this incident.2
Sharlene Tillet was not a first time victim of domestic violence.
While pregnant with her second child, she separated from her baby's
father and purchased a plane ticket to relocate to California to protect
herself from further abuse. Before she left, however, he beat her one
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to
Professor Ann Moynihan for her invaluable insight and encouragement during the
writing of this Note. Special thanks to my parents, Michael and Maryann
Trepiccione, and to Bill, for their endless patience and support of my endeavors.
1. Ms. Nicholson is the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit filed in the Eastern
District of New York by the law firm of Lansner & Kubitschek. The suit was brought
in June 2000 on behalf of Ms. Nicholson and other battered mothers who have been
charged with child neglect solely because their children have witnessed domestic
violence. The complaint alleges that the class represents more than 5000 people, and
will increase by an additional 1000 people each year. See Amended Complaint Class
Action at 2, 11-12, Nicholson v. Williams (E.D.N.Y. filed June 15, 2000) (No. 00-CV-
2229) [hereinafter Nicholson Amended Complaint].
2. Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice Taking a Child When One Parent is Battered,
N.Y. Times, July 8,2000, at Al.
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night in her apartment. After Sharlene gave birth to her son Uganda,
a hospital social worker routinely questioned her about any history of
domestic violence. Sharlene honestly responded to the social worker,
and two days later child welfare caseworkers and police officers
removed her newborn from her custody. Sharlene was charged with
neglect for allegedly exposing Uganda to domestic violence, though
he was not even born when the incident occurred. Sharlene could not
regain custody of Uganda for seven weeks, and the court ordered her
to attend domestic violence victim workshops, parenting classes, and
weekly counseling. Currently, Sharlene and Uganda live in a battered
women's shelter.'
During legal proceedings, child protective services presumed that
both Sharwline and Sharlene's children had actually witnessed
domestic violence in the home.4 As a result, child protective services
removed the children from their mothers' care. The experiences of
these battered mothers are extremely common, and on the rise.
Though the cases vary widely in complexity, the result is the same. In
various states, children can be removed from the home and placed in
foster care if a parent, usually the mother,5 is a victim of domestic
violence.6 The battered mother is charged with neglect for exposing
her children to domestic violence and for "failing to protect her
children from danger."7 This policy may be a result of the increasing
attention given to the plight of domestic violence in the United States
today.' This practice, however, is enveloped by controversy: "Is it fair
to punish an abused woman by taking her children away? Is it wise to
return children to a parent who has been unable to shield them from
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal
Justice Response 4, 8 (James A. Inciaradi ed., 2d ed. 1996) (acknowledging "the
disproportionate amount of male violence against women," indicating that "[in over
90% of the violence by intimates recorded, the victim was female," and describing
that "[o]n average, each year women were the victims of over 572,000 violent
victimizations committed by an intimate compared to approximately 49,000 incidents
committed against men").
6. See infra notes 25-78 and accompanying text.
7. Sengupta, supra note 2.
8. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers With
"Failure to Protect:" Still Blaming the Victim, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 849, 849 (2000):
In the past several years, efforts to recognize [the harm caused by domestic
violence] have led to the passage of new state laws that allow for concurrent
cnminal and family court jurisdiction in domestic violence cases, mandate
arrest in domestic violence situations and require courts to consider
domestic violence as a factor in custody decisions. Unfortunately, the
heightened awareness of the harm domestic violence causes children has
also resulted in a punitive policy towards battered women in the child
welfare system.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Sengupta, supra note 2 ("In some ways, these cases
reflect an unintended consequence of new and arguably enlightened perspectives on
domestic violence.").
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the danger of an abusive partner?"9 These are only some questions
raised in the debate over whether to remove children from the
custody of their battered mothers when they witness domestic
violence.
This Note examines whether the policy of removing witnessing
children from their victimized mothers is acceptable from both a
social science viewpoint and a constitutional law perspective. Part I
reviews the foundations of this policy in case law and in various state
statutes. This part also examines social science literature concerning
the effects of witnessing domestic violence on children and highlights
the results and flaws in this body of research. Part II discusses the
conflict at the heart of this policy by considering the clashing interests
and rights of the parties affected by this practice-the battered
mother, the child, and the state. Part III argues that this practice must
be carefully re-examined because its constitutionality is questionable.
This part further asserts that, based on flawed and underdeveloped
social science research, a state's uniform, indiscriminate policy of
removing children from their battered mothers may not be necessary
to further a compelling governmental interest. This Note concludes
that the current policy of charging a mother with failure to protect in
domestic violence cases should be re-examined in light of numerous,
less burdensome alternatives to "across the board" removal.
I. ROOTED IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: FAILURE TO PROTECT
WHEN CHILDREN WITNESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Development of the Failure to Protect Doctrine in Child Abuse and
Neglect Cases
1. What is "Failure to Protect"?
The rising number"0 of reported child maltreatment" incidents has
prompted a widespread judicial and legislative response toward what
has been dubbed a parent's "failure to protect" his or her child from
abuse or neglect. 2 The failure to protect standard was extrapolated
from state child protective statutes, such as child abuse, neglect, aiding
9. Sengupta, supra note 2.
10. Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women 11ho Fail
to Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 Hastings Women's LJ.
67, 67 n.1 (1995) (describing the rise in reported child abuse cases in the early 1990s
from 2.7 million in 1991 to 3 million in 1992, and noting the percentages of reported
deaths from abuse and neglect in the mid-1990s).
11. For the purposes of this part, "child maltreatment" refers to both abuse and
neglect. However, the remainder of this Note discusses charging battered women
with neglect only, under neglect statutes, for failing to protect their non-abused
children from witnessing domestic violence.
12. Panko, supra note 10, at 67-68.
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and abetting, and involuntary homicide laws. 3 Child protective
statutes, in particular abuse laws, take two forms. 4 First, commission
statutes convict actual, active abusers. 5 Second, omission statutes
penalize "passive" abusers who expose children to the risk of harm, or
fail to protect a child from maltreatment where a duty to do so exists.'
Initially, the failure to protect doctrine was used to hold parents liable
for child maltreatment under the omission child protective statutes
when they failed to prevent actual abuse by an identifiable offender. 7
Under child neglect laws, however, parents may also be liable for
"failure to protect" when they "permit" children to remain in an
environment where abuse could occur or the risk of harm is evident."
The most common sources of risk of harm to children are violence in
the home and in the community.'9 As such, courts are now widely
applying the failure to protect doctrine to families plagued by
domestic violence, chiefly where the father is physically and
emotionally abusing the mother.
2. "Failure to Protect" in the Realm of Domestic Violence
Despite the fact that the failure to protect doctrine was traditionally
used only when a child was actually harmed, a nationwide trend has
recently surfaced whereby battered mothers are charged with failure
to protect under state neglect statutes for exposing their children to
domestic violence.2 Children of battered women often witness their
13. See id. at 68 nn.6-7 (indicating that parents can be criminally or civilly liable
for failure to protect, depending on the statute under which the charges are brought
and the context of the child maltreatment); see also Kristian Miccio, In the Name of
Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the
"Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1087, 1089 (1995)
(asserting that "the application of child protective statutes in cases where states have
brought charges against abused mothers, via the theory of failure to protect" is a
method of using abuse and neglect statutes to punish mothers).
14. Panko, supra note 10, at 67-68.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 68.
17. See id. at 67; see, e.g., In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 1226, 1226 (I11. App. Ct. 1981)
(adjudicating mother neglectful where children were beaten, threatened with guns,
and subjected to other forms of physical abuse at the hands of their father for many
years).
18. Miccio, supra note 13, at 1089.
19. See Joy D. Osofsky, Children as Invisible Victims of Domestic and Community
Violence, in Children Exposed to Marital Violence: Theory, Research, and Applied
Issues 95 (George W. Holden et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Children Exposed]; see
also infra Part I.B. (discussing the effects on children witnessing violence in the home
and in the community in further detail).
20. See Miccio, supra note 13, at 1090 ("We, as a society, are holding mothers
accountable for conduct they did not engage in, conduct that, until recently, was
socially permissible and conduct that authorities are still loath to stop." (citations
omitted)); The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 849; see also
infra text accompanying notes 24-78 (highlighting several states where battered
mothers are charged with neglect for exposing their children to domestic violence).
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mother being beaten and threatened, and/or view the aftermath of
partner violence including bruises, black eyes, and broken bones,
without being physically abused themselves.21 In many jurisdictions,
child protective services and family courts presume that witnessing
abuse harms children and places them at risk for experiencing abuse.--
As a result, many states, with New York State as the leader, have
instituted a policy of charging battered mothers with neglect and
temporarily removing their children if the children witness domestic
violence.24
The rationale for this policy is rooted in state neglect statutes,
legislative history, and case law. Several state courts, chiefly those in
New York and Illinois, have adopted the failure to protect doctrine in
family court and appellate court decisions.
In New York, Article 10 of the Family Court Act ("FCA") provides
the statutory basis for finding a parent liable for neglect.' The FCA
21. Leslie D. Johnson, Student Article, Caught in the Crossfire: Examining
Legislative and Judicial Response to the Forgotten Victims of Domestic Violence, 22
Law & Psychol. Rev. 271,273-74 (1998).
22. See generally infra notes 48,54 and accompanying text.
23. This Note primarily deals with failure to protect in the context of temporary
removal of a child from a battered mother's care, which allows child protective
services to remove a neglected or abused child temporarily from the parents' home.
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (describing the process of
temporary removal in New York). A minor child, under age eighteen, is usually
placed in a state institution or foster home after removal, and child protective services
take steps to reunite the family. Id. If the family is unable to be reunited because a
positive, healthy parent-child relationship is no longer present, the state may
terminate a parent's rights through additional legal proceedings. Id. For a detailed
discussion of permanent termination of a mother's parental rights for failure to
protect in other contexts, see Lesley E. Daigle, Empowering Women to Protect:
Improving Intervention with Victims of Domestic Violence in Cases of Child Abuse
and Neglect" A Study of Travis County, Texas, 7 Tex. J. Women & L 287 (1998) and
Amy Haddix, Comment, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging tie Effects of Domestic
Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 Cal. L
Rev. 757 (1996).
24. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 849-51.
25. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 1999). The relevant portion of Article
10 defines "neglected child" as:
a child less than eighteen years of age (i) whose physical, mental or
emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other person
legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care (A) in
supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education in
accordance with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the
education law, or medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care, though
financially able to do so; or (B) in providing the child with proper
supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be
inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including infliction of excessive
corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug or drugs; or by misusing
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or
by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the
court... ; or (ii) who has been abandoned.
Id. § 1012(f); see also The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 851
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provides that a court should find a parent neglectful when the
"physical, mental or emotional condition [of the child] has been
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of
the failure of his parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care. "26
Under the FCA, a neglectful parent unreasonably inflicts or allows
another to inflict harm on the child, or condones a substantial risk of
harm to the child.27 The New York Appellate Division has broadly
interpreted the FCA to consider domestic violence in general a basis
for finding neglect under the statutory language-"any other acts of a
similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court."2
In New York, the inclusion of witnessing domestic violence as a
basis for finding a battered mother neglectful is a novel development
of the past decade. In the early 1990s, family courts often declined to
consider acts of violence committed by a father against a mother in
the presence of the children a basis for finding neglect. 29 Many family
courts actually dismissed neglect petitions where the basis of the
complaint was that the children witnessed domestic violence.3 ° Family
courts instead required proof that a child suffered actual physical,
mental, or emotional impairment from witnessing the violence, and
that the child was in imminent danger of experiencing harm?'
Without expert testimony attesting to such harm, New York courts
found it difficult to make a finding of neglect based on a child's
witnessing of domestic violence.32  Courts considered the harm
substantiated only after psychologists, social workers, and other
mental health professionals assessed the children and presented their
findings in court.33 Judges then would attribute the impairment to the
(discussing the requirements for a finding of neglect under the FCA).
26. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1012(t)(i).
27. Id. § 1012(f)(i)(B).
28. Id.; In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666, 666-67 (App. Div. 1998); In re Lonell
J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (App. Div. 1998).
29. See In re Bryan L., 565 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971-73 (Fain. Ct. 1991) (dismissing
neglect petition against parents where father assaulted mother in presence of their
toddler and his eight-year-old daughter, and requiring evidence that the children were
in imminent danger for adjudication of neglect).
30. See, e.g., Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116;
Theresa "CC," 576 N.Y.S.2d at 937 (App. Div. 1991); Bryan L., 565 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
31. Bryant L., 565 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
32. Id. at 972-73; Theresa "CC", 576 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (holding that children were
neglected based on both their witnessing continuous domestic violence over a ten-
year period and on the testimony of a clinical psychologist who considered the
children seriously emotionally impaired as a result of the violence); In re Michael M.,
591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that children were neglected due to
exposure to domestic violence where their father abused their mother, and
determining that the children were at substantial risk of impairment, according to the
expert testimony of psychologist).
33. See, e.g., Theresa "CC", 576 N.Y.S.2d at 938-39 ("We conclude that the weight
of the evidence in this record supports a finding of neglect.").
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lack of a minimum degree of care exercised by the parents when they
engaged in domestic violence, and would therefore find neglect.-'
By the mid to late 1990s, however, New York courts adopted a new
approach to domestic violence cases that was enunciated in the
controversial case In re Lonell J.3 The mother in Lonell J. admitted
that she was severely beaten by her husband and was forced to have
intercourse with him. 6 She ultimately obtained an order of protection
against him .3 The police were called to the home on at least six
occasions, and the mother fled to her family's home for a period of
time.3s  According to an Administration for Children's Services
("ACS") 39 investigation, the father beat the mother in front of the
children on various occasions.4 As a result, ACS filed a neglect
petition against both the mother and father, removed the children
from the home, and placed them in foster care.4
The Appellate Division, First Department,42 reversed the Family
Court's decision to dismiss the neglect petition,43 and adjudicated both
the abusive father and battered mother neglectful in this case." The
Appellate Division reasoned that parents' domestic abuse should be
considered an act of neglect, as broadly defined under the FCA
§ 1012(f)(i)(B) as "other acts of a similarly serious nature."4 5 The
court also determined that nothing in § 1012 of the FCA required
34. Id. at 938 (determining that the children's emotional impairment was "clearly
attributable to the unwillingness or inability of [the parents] to exercise a minimum
degree of care toward the child" as defined by FCA § 1012(h). because the parents
engaged in ongoing domestic violence (alteration in original)).
35. See generally Theresa "CC", 576 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1991) (adjudicating
children neglected based on domestic violence between parents over ten-year period);
In re Melissa "U", 538 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989) (reversing Family Court
decision and finding mother neglectful when she permitted her boyfriend, who had
previously assaulted her in the presence of her children, to move into her home); In re
Michael M., 591 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fain. Ct. 1992) (determining that children were
neglected due to consistent exposure to domestic violence between parents); The
"Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8. at 852 ("Lonell J. is significant
because it is the first case in New York State to hold that a non-abusing mother may
be neglectful for failing to protect her children from witnessing domestic violence.").
36. LonelIJ., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116-17.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 117.
39. The Administration for Children's Services is the child protective services
agency of New York City.
40. LonellJ., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
41. Id.
42. The New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State, has not
yet addressed the issue of failure to protect and child witnessing in domestic violence
cases.
43. See id. at 119. The Family Court had required that "until the Legislature
amended Family Court Act § 1012 to make domestic violence between parents a per
se act of neglect, expert testimony was necessary to establish that these children had
been traumatized by witnessing their parents' fights." Id. at 117.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id.
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expert testimony in order to find a child neglected, and it
subsequently held that expert testimony was not needed to prove
harm to a child witness of domestic violence.46 The court also
criticized previous decisions requiring expert testimony, and stated
that such evidence is relevant only if the children are old enough to
communicate the effects of the violence on their emotional and
mental state.47 The Appellate Division further noted that the
legislative history of FCA § 1012, which emphasized the adverse
physical and mental effects of domestic abuse on children, was
sufficient proof that witnessing domestic violence harms children. 8
In Lonell J., the Appellate Division also appeared to establish the
startling policy of holding a battered mother "strictly" liable for the
actions of her batterer.49 Although the mother had experienced a
pattern of severe domestic abuse and made several efforts to escape
her situation, the court determined that she was unwilling to leave her
batterer and therefore neglected her children by exposing them to the
violence." The appellate court's analysis in Lonell J. was buttressed
by an earlier decision, In re Glenn G., 11 which held that the neglect
statute in New York State imposes strict liability on a parent or
guardian.52 In Glenn G., the court stated that a mother's reasons for
remaining with her abuser were irrelevant to her liability under the
neglect statute. 3
The repercussions of Lonell J. and the resulting change in the
interpretation of neglect law are vast and far-reaching. The failure to
protect policy applied to the mother of Lonell J. has since been
adopted in many New York neglect cases involving children who
witness domestic violence? 4 Also, after Lonell J., child protective
46. Id. at 117.
47. Id. at 118.
48. See id. ("[Tjhe Legislature cited several studies proving that children in violent
homes experience delayed development, psychosomatic illness and feelings of fear
and depression, and often become the victims of abuse themselves."). The court in
Lonell J., however, failed to cite these studies or related psychosocial literature, but
rather chose to cite a law review article in support of its contentions. Id.; see also In re
Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998) ("Given the Legislature's
awareness of and concern for the detrimental effects of domestic violence on children,
Family Court Act § 1012(f)(i)(B) was drafted in sufficiently broad terms to
encompass domestic violence as a permissible basis upon which to make a finding of
neglect.").
49. The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 852.
50. See LonellJ., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
51. 587 N.Y.S.2d 467, 470 (Fain. Ct. 1992) (agreeing with the petitioner's
argument that "whether the mother was a battered woman is irrelevant" and asserting
that "the neglect statute.., imposes strict liability").
52. Id. at 470.
53. See id. (holding that mother neglected her children for failing to protect them
from abuse by their father, even if she suffered from Battered Women's Syndrome
which made her powerless to stop the abuse). For a description of Battered Women's
Syndrome, see infra note 184.
54. See In re Jasmine R., 683 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999) (finding neglect of
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agencies, such as ACS, are removing children from their homes and
sustaining charges of neglect against non-abusing mothers more easily
in situations of domestic violence.5
Furthermore, other jurisdictions, including Illinois, Nebraska, and
California, have embraced this policy. In Illinois, the Juvenile Court
Act ("JCA") provides the legal basis for finding a child neglected."
Under the JCA, a neglected child is a minor "who is not receiving the
proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical
or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a
minor's well-being" or a child "whose environment is injurious to his
or her welfare."57 Illinois courts interpret neglect as an adult's failure
to care for a child, including "both willful and unintentional disregard
of parental duty.""8 The Illinois Appellate Court, an intermediate
appellate court, has repeatedly held that domestic violence between
parents will inflict emotional harm on witnessing children and
constitutes neglect. 9
In an older case, In re A.D.R.,6' the Illinois Appellate Court held
that the father's abuse of the mother for seven years created an
injurious environment for the child.6' The court reasoned that it could
adjudicate neglect before the child was physically abused herself or
endured permanent emotional damage from witnessing the beatings
children because of exposure to domestic violence between parents); In re Athena M.,
678 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1998) (affirming finding of neglect by the Family Court
based on domestic violence between parents and indicating that violent acts in the
presence of the children placed them in imminent danger of impairment, "as a matter
of common sense"); In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1998) (deciding
that father's abuse of mother in presence of child warranted finding of neglect); see
also Sengupta, supra note 2, stating:
The city can take children into foster care if a parent is believed to 'engage
in acts of domestic violence.' Its authority to do so was strengthened by a
1998 state court ruling that declared incidents of domestic violence in the
presence of a child to be sufficient grounds for a charge of neglect.
55. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 853.
56. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405 (West 1999).
57. Id. at 405/2-3 (1)(a)-(b).
58. In re S.S., 728 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (citing In re Ashley F.,
638 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
59. See S.S., 728 N.E.2d at 1172, stating:
We agree that it is reasonable for a trial court to conclude that continuing
physical abuse by one parent of another will cause emotional damage to a
child and thus constitutes neglect. We also agree that the trial court need
not wait... until the repeated beatings of his mother cause so much damage
that he is permanently affected.
(citations omitted); see also In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487, 492 (I1M. App. Ct. 1989)
("[Ilt is not unreasonable for a trial judge to conclude continuing physical abuse by
one parent to another will cause emotional damage to a child and thus constitute
neglect."). The Illinois Supreme Court, the highest court in the state of Illinois, has
not yet addressed the issue of failure to protect and child witnessing in domestic
violence cases.
60. 542 N.E.2d 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
61. Id. at 492.
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of her mother.62 The court emphasized the parents' seven-year
abusive marriage, commitment to remain together, and apparent lack
of "any special relationship" with their infant daughter as further
support for a finding of neglect.63 Although A.D.R.'s mother
continually denied or trivialized the extent of the beatings, A.D.R.
was temporarily removed from the home by the Department of
Children and Family Services and was declared a ward of the state at
the termination of appellate court proceedings.'
In a more recent case, In re S.S.,65 the Illinois Trial Court previously
held a child neglected and removed him from his mother's custody for
two years.66 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
finding of neglect because, in this particular case of witnessing
domestic violence, the abuse consisted of one incident, the child was
not present during the violence, and the couple did not live together.,
The appellate court, however, adhered to the holding of In re
A.D.R..' Although the outcome in this specific case was ultimately
favorable for the battered mother given the above-mentioned
circumstances, the court in S.S. affirmed that a child's witnessing of
domestic violence indeed remains a basis for a neglect finding in
Illinois.69
In Nebraska and California, the application of the failure to protect
doctrine in witnessing domestic violence cases is prevalent, though
less common. Nonetheless, Nebraska's stance on failure to protect
may be harsher than her sister states because the Supreme Court of
Nebraska not only adjudicated a battered mother neglectful, but also
terminated her parental rights for maintaining an ongoing relationship
with the batterer.70 The court reasoned that the mother was unable to
create a "loving and safe environment" for her child while in an
abusive relationship, despite her multiple efforts to leave and divorce
the father.71 Given that the mother failed to actively extricate herself
from the battering, the court determined that she substantially and
repeatedly neglected her child and refused to care for and protect
him.72  Although this decision was rendered in the early 1990s, it
remains good law in Nebraska.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 491.
64. Id. at 488-89, 492.
65. 728 N.E.2d 1165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
66. S.S., 728 N.E.2d at 1174.
67. Id. at 1172.
68. See id.; see also supra note 59 (quoting leading Illinois case law on a child's
witnessing of domestic violence as a basis for neglect adjudication).
69. See S.S., 728 N.E.2d at 1172.
70. See In re C.D.C., 455 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Neb. 1990).
71. Id. at 807-08.
72. Id. at 807. The Nebraska statute defines "abuse or neglect" as:
knowingly, intentionally, or negligently causing or permitting a minor child
to be: (a) Placed in a situation that endangers his or her life or physical or
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As early as 1986, California courts7 recognized that exposure to
domestic violence was a potential threat to a child's safety. In one
case, In re Jon N.,74 the California Court of Appeal temporarily
removed a child from his parents due to the physical violence between
them.' Most recently, California's application of failure to protect"
was manifested in the state's acknowledgement that children who
witness domestic violence suffer from "secondary abuse."'  In one
case, twin girls were adjudicated neglected by the California Court of
Appeal based on the opinion of three experts who stated that the
domestic violence perpetrated by the father against the stepmother
created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the
children.7 8
States such as New York, Illinois, Nebraska, and California attempt
to prevent children from witnessing domestic violence through the
uniform policy of finding parents, often the battered mother,
neglectful and then removing the children from the home."9 A
handful of states, however, have declined to follow this approach. For
example, the District Court of Appeal of Florida refused to maintain a
neglect petition against a couple even though the children had
witnessed verbal domestic violence and alcohol abuse." The court
considered the battered mother's flight to a domestic violence shelter
on one occasion a factor in holding that child protective services
lacked evidence pointing to significant impairment to the child's
mental health; (b) Cruelly confined or cruelly punished; (c) Deprived of
necessary food, clothing, shelter, or care; (d) Left unattended in a motor
vehicle if such minor child is six years of age or younger, (e) Sexually
abused; or (f) Sexually exploited by allowing, encouraging, or forcing such
person to solicit for or engage in prostitution, debauchery, public indecency,
or obscene or pornographic photography, films, or depictions.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-710(3) (1995).
73. In California, the case law considers both parents at fault for exposing their
children to domestic violence. Arguably both father and mother are punished in
these situations, however this example of failure to protect policy does not minimize
the primary effect of this widespread practice on battered mothers.
74. 224 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1986).
75. Id at 322.
76. For the definition of "neglect," section 4900(e) of the California Welfare &
Institutions Code refers to section 11165.2 of the California Penal Code. The
California statute defines the term "neglect," in part, as "the negligent treatment or
the maltreatment of a child by a person responsible for the child's welfare under
circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child's health or welfare.
The term includes both acts and omissions on the part of the responsible person." Cal.
Penal Code § 11165.2 (West 2000). The statute further divides neglect into two
categories, "severe" and "general." Id.
77. See In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1996) (removing
children temporarily from father and stepmother's custody where father continually
abused stepmother in presence of four-year-old daughters).
78. Id. at 321-22.
79. See supra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
80. See Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. M.B., 717 So. 2d 607, 607-08 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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physical, mental or emotional health or to risk thereof, as required by
the Florida neglect statute. 81 The court then ordered that the children,
who were temporarily removed from their parents' home, be
returned.' In another case, the same Florida court refused to remove
the children at the request of child protective services because the
allegation of domestic violence in the home did not support
adjudicating the children wards of the state.83
Other states, including Iowa,' Oklahoma, and Minnesota, have
codified an affirmative defense for a parent's failure to protect in child
neglect and abuse cases.86 Battered mothers in particular may use this
defense when there is duress or an inability to act due to reasonable
fear of the abuserY The Minnesota statute provides that the
affirmative defense can be raised when "at the time of the neglect or
endangerment there was a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the
defendant that acting to stop or prevent the neglect or endangerment
would result in substantial bodily harm to the defendant or the child
in retaliation."'  Under these groundbreaking laws, a battered
mother's fear of her abuser's violence provides an effective
affirmative defense to allegations of neglect in the form of failure to
protect.89
A common theme woven throughout the case law and statutes
regarding failure to protect and neglect is the presumed harm suffered
by child witnesses of domestic violence. Courts only allude to the
81. Id. The Florida statute defines "neglect" as:
when the parent or legal custodian of a child or, in the absence of a parent or
legal custodian, the caregiver deprives a child of, or allows a child to be
deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or
permits a child to live in an environment when such deprivation or
environment causes the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be
significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly impaired.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.01(46) (West Supp. 2001).
82. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. 717 So. 2d at 607.
83. Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating that there was no evidence that the child was
neglected or at risk).
84. Iowa Code Ann. § 726.6(e) (West Supp. 2000).
85. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 852.1 (a) (West Supp. 2001).
86. See Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal
Connections and Controversies, 29 Fam. L.Q. 357, 364-65 (1995); see also Audrey E.
Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Family Violence:
Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, 20 Harv. Women's L.J. 205, 211 n.38 (1997) (citing
Davidson, supra, at 364).
87. Davidson, supra note 86, at 364-65.
88. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.378(2) (West Supp. 2001); see also Davidson, supra
note 86, at 365.
89. See Stone & Fialk, supra note 86, at 211 n.38 ("These laws provide that fear of
substantial bodily harm to the defendant [mother] or the child in retaliation for an
attempt to stop or prevent abuse is an affirmative defense to charges of failure to
protect." (quoting Andrew R. Klein, Quincy Court Spousal/Partner Assault: A
Protocol For the Sentencing and Supervision of Offenders 20 (1992))).
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source and development of a child's impairment," and do not specify
the mechanism and extent of the harm.' Although largely ignored by
the legal system, a developing body of research explores the
psychological effects of witnessing domestic violence on children.'
In order to juxtapose the legal system's assessment of failure to
protect in the context of domestic violence with the social science
community's data on exposing children to domestic violence, it is
necessary to explore the current state of the research on child
witnesses of domestic abuse. Some studies indicate that witnessing
domestic violence produces both long and short-term effects on
children, but it is important to examine the results of these studies for
their flaws.
B. Social Science Research Regarding the Psychological Effects of
Domestic Violence on Child Witnesses
1. A Widely-Held View: Witnessing Domestic Violence
Harms Children
Studies estimate that anywhere between 3.3 and 17.8 million
children are exposed to domestic violence in the United States. 3
Although the research that examines childhood exposure to domestic
violence varies in defining what constitutes witnessing, a common
description includes seeing and hearing violence between parents, as
well as observing the effects of parental physical assaults.' Some
characteristic results of the violence include seeing blood or bruises on
the mother, observing weapons in the home, and having a depressed
mother.95 Though this area of research remains in its fledgling
stages,96 studies performed over the past fifteen years demonstrate
that children of battered women are at high risk for both short and
long-term emotional and behavioral problems.97
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. See infra Part I.B.
93. George W. Holden, Introduction: The Development of Research Into Another
Consequence of Family Violence, in Children Exposed, supra note 19 at 1, 2
[hereinafter Holden, Introduction].
94. Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Erposed to Partner Violence, in
Partner Violence: A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research 73, 73 (Jana L
Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998).
95. See id. at 73, 84-85.
96. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 3-4 ("[Tlhe total number of articles on
these children published in peer-reviewed journals amounts to only 56 articles...
supplemented by a few review articles..., several chapters, and at least three books
that focus on the children of battered women.").
97. George W. Holden et al., Parenting Behaviors and Beliefs of Battered Women,
in Children Exposed, supra note 19, at 289, 290 [hereinafter Holden, Parenting
Behaviors].
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Studies indicate that short-term effects of witnessing domestic
violence vary based on the developmental level of the child. Infants
exposed to violence may experience a disruption of their attachment
bond to their mother, feeding patterns, and sleeping routines.9"
Children may exhibit emotional and behavioral problems often
characterized by aggression or clinginess. 9 Both boys and girls may
perform poorly in school and experience shyness, depression, anxiety,
low self-esteem, and guilt."° Long-term effects are explainable by
social learning theory, or the idea that children learn aggression from
their parents, and therefore are more likely to become perpetrators of
violence as adults. 10' While male children may be more likely to
become abusers, female children may learn to accept victimization,
and both sexes learn that violence is an acceptable response to
interpersonal problems.tm
Researchers are also concerned with other risks associated with
childhood exposure to domestic violence. First, some children may be
in danger of direct abuse or inadvertent physical harm in homes
plagued by spousal violence0 3 because children sometimes interfere in
parental disputes and often find themselves amidst flying fists,
weapons, and airborne objects."° They may also be at risk of
becoming victims of direct physical, sexual, or emotional abuse.'"
Second, exposure to violence may increase the incidence of post-
traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") in children. 6 PTSD is defined as
"a specific psychiatric disturbance caused by exposure to an extreme
stressor" with manifestations that include reliving the experience
through dreams or recollections, sleep difficulties, irritability, and
feelings of emotional detachment.I° Third, child witnesses may be
adversely affected by the stress that their battered mothers feel as a
product of being in an abusive relationship. 0 8
The foregoing evidence of alleged harm to children witnessing
domestic violence does not reveal the entire story, however, because
98. Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children Who Witness Woman Battering:
Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 Law & Psychol. Rev. 137, 145
(1994).
99. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 83.
100. Tomkins et al., supra note 98, at 145-47.
101. Id. at 149-52; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 83.
102. Tomkins et al., supra note 98, at 151-52.
103. Id. at 152-53; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 82.
104. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 82.
105. Tomkins et al., supra note 98, at 152.
106. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 82.
107. Id.
108. Id. (describing how children may experience indirect effects of partner
violence including "maternal physical and psychological ill health resulting from the
stress of being abused, exposure to paternal anger and irritability, and inconsistent or
overly harsh parental disciplinary practices by parents who may be particularly
distracted and irritable").
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many researchers believe that current studies are flawed."' While
evidence seemingly demonstrates that children are harmed by
witnessing domestic violence, critics presently question the accuracy,
methodology, and thoroughness of this body of research,"" and call
for new, more comprehensive studies.' Clearly, studying the effects
of domestic violence on children is necessary and important, both for
their immediate and long-term well-being." 2  Currently, however,
several areas of this research require improvement in order to more
accurately assess the harm that child witnesses of domestic violence
experience.
2. The Current Body of Research: Methodological Flaws,
Inaccuracies, and Areas for Improvement
Researchers have identified numerous limitations in the studies that
find harm to child witnesses of domestic violence. A review of the
literature suggests that two such weaknesses are methodological
flaws" 3 and highly variable results across studies.'
The quality of the research on child witnesses of domestic violence
is adversely affected by flaws in the methods used to perform these
studies. Though some studies discovered a range of variables that
may affect the level of harm experienced by a child witness of
domestic violence," 5 the methodologies of these studies are erratic. "'
109. Gary J. Maxwell, Women and Children First... Why Not Build Enough
Lifeboats? News from the Front: A Report on the Honolulu Conference "Two Systens-
One Family, Bringing the Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Communities Together"
(March 23-24, 2000), 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 33, 34 (2000) ("A growing body of
clinical evidence is emerging with respect to the harm experienced by children who
observe incidents of domestic violence or live in a home where violence is occurring.
It is problematic that... the clinical assessment tools utilized to determine whether
"abuse" has occurred in the child-protective context are imperfect at best and often
defective.").
110. See infra Part I.B.2.
111. See infra Part I.B.2.
112. See Kathleen J. Sternberg et al., Using Multiple Informants to Understand
Domestic Violence and Its Effects, in Children Exposed, supra note 19, at 121.
113. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10-11.
114. See Sternberg et al., supra note 112, at 121.
After nearly 30 years of research, researchers should have a good
understanding of domestic violence and its effects on child development. No
one doubts that domestic violence is harmful to children or that the
psychological distress they experience should often be manifest in behavior
problems, of course, yet the reported behavioral and psychological
characteristics of... witnesses vary considerably across studies.
Id.
115. These variables include: "(a) the nature of the violence (e.g., severity and
chronicity); (b) ethnicity; (c) the level of stress experienced by the mother, (d) the
quality of mothering; (e) whether the child was also the recipient of verbal or physical
abuse; and (f) child characteristics (self-esteem, personality characteristics)." Holden,
Introduction, supra note 93, at 10.
116. Id. at 10-11.
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First, studies used vastly different, inadequate definitions of "marital
abuse" and "domestic violence," which generated inconsistent
results.'1 7 Early studies often failed to distinguish between physical
violence to the mother and other family violence, while very few
studies examined whether the child had actually observed the
violence."1 These definitions also failed to distinguish children who
were direct victims of abuse from those who were only witnesses of
spousal violence, thereby creating the potential for an incorrect
assessment of harm for two very different experiences." 9
Second, studies generally used battered mothers' reports as the only
source for assessing the nature of the domestic violence.1 20  This
practice is problematic because the abused women may not be
objective, reliance on a single informant in any study decreases the
reliability of the study, and children are rarely asked to give separate
accounts of the violence.' 2' Battered women may deny or underreport
the abuse, and may not be aware of their child's witnessing. 2 2
Furthermore, the assessed battered mothers were most often studied
while in a battered woman's shelter." Women in shelters constitute
only a small sample size of abused women and "may not be
representative of the more general population of battered women and
their children."' 24  Additionally, research shows considerable
differences in how women in shelters view their children's behavior
and how other observers or the children themselves assess the same
conduct."2 If children are assessed at all, many reside in shelters with
their mothers, and their behavioral problems may be a result of family
upheaval rather than the witnessing of domestic violence. 2 6  A
family's time in a shelter is often characterized by heightened stress
that may influence the psychological well-being of both battered
mothers and their children. 7 Additionally, assessment of the father
117. Id.
118. See Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, The Impact of Woman Abuse on Children's
Social Development: Research and Theoretical Perspectives, in Children Exposed,
supra note 19, at 21, 29-30 (discussing parental abuse of the child, which may be
included in "other family violence").
119. See Sternberg et al., supra note 1142, at 129.
120. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10-11; Sternberg et al., supra note
1142, at 124-27; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 97-98.
121. Sternberg et al., supra note 1142, at 124-27; see Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note
94, at 97-98.
122. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 5.
123. Id. at 10-11; Sternberg et al., supra note 1142, at 124-27; Wolak & Finkelhor.
supra note 94, at 98.
124. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10-11.
125. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 98 (citing two studies, the first in 1983
and the second in 1993, that support the problematic use of battered mothers as a
source of data in domestic violence research on child witnesses).
126. Id.
127. Timothy E. Moore & Debra J. Pepler, Correlates of Adjustment in Children at
Risk, in Children Exposed, supra note 19, at 157, 159.
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and his behavior regarding the children is nonexistent because the
abusers are rarely interviewed."2
Third, the nature of the violence within the family has been
virtually ignored.129 Reports of the type, severity, and frequency of
partner violence are rare, and the specifics of a child's exposure to
domestic violence are therefore not fully assessed.'-" Some
researchers insist that the harm associated with exposure to domestic
violence depends on the severity, chronicity, and intensity of the
violence, but current studies fail to explore these factors adequately.",
No substantive conclusions have been drawn on this topic, except for
the obvious deduction that an increase in severity of the violence will
probably have an impact on the witnessing child.'"2
Other related factors that are not usually measured, but that
researchers believe should be, include: "basic demographic
information such as socioeconomic status, race, unemployment, family
structure, and age of parents, as well as family factors known to affect
children adversely, such as substance abuse by parents, paternal or
maternal physical and mental health, pathology and stress, parenting
ability, and stability of the home environment."'3 3 Also, relevant
"child variables" are not examined carefully.'- Given that witnessing
children experience "no typical pattern of problems," researchers
speculate that the harm may be shaped by individual child differences
such as age and gender. 3  Age, gender, and intelligence of children,
however, are repeatedly overlooked, and studies often lump all ages
128. Sternberg et al., supra note 1142, at 125; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at
85.
129. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10.
130. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 77, 90,98.
131. See id at 77 ("Little is known about how many incidents children who witness
violence observe and how often violence occurs."); id. at 90 ("Scant research has been
conducted on [the nature and severity of what is seen] within the field of partner
violence."); see also E. Mark Cummings, Children Erposed to Marital Conflict and
Violence: Conceptual and Theoretical Directions, in Children Exposed, supra note 19,
at 55, 56 ("However, the impact of marital violence should not be oversimplified or
considered in isolation.... [Ilts impact undoubtedly depends on its severity.
chronicity, and intensity."); Graham-Bermann. supra note 118, at 30 ("Few
researchers have studied or controlled for the number of abusive partners the mother
has had, the chronicity of her abuse, or the length of the child's exposure to this
violence."). But see Nancy E. Johnson, Domestic Violence Research: The Year in
Review 55, 55-56 (1998) (describing a psychological study which -suggests that all
[domestic violence] has the potential to induce trauma in the child witness regardless
of intensity or frequency" and stating that "for the child witness at least, a 'minor'
incidence of [domestic violence] would appear to be a myth") (quotation in inset).
Dr. Johnson criticized this exploratory study, however, for drawing strong conclusions
despite significant flaws and limitations, which include a small sample size, unequal
comparison groups in number and composition, and questions too complicated for
young children to understand. Id.
132. See Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 90.
133. Id. at 98.
134. Id.
135. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93. at 7.
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into one group without considering developmental variations.' 6
Moreover, the majority of research focuses on the middle childhood
years, and as a result, largely ignores adolescents.'37 Researchers also
acknowledge that, although exposure to domestic violence may be a
potential risk to a child's emotional and behavioral well-being, it often
operates in tandem with other stressors in a child's life, including
substandard housing and financial troubles. 3 ' Children may also
experience other forms of violence, including community violence,
other than, or in addition to, witnessing the ill-treatment of their
mother.'39
Studies have also been plagued by problematic research designs.
Many studies lack crucial comparison groups of children from
nonviolent homes.140  Furthermore, sample sizes are small and
researchers tend to use highly variable, nonstandard surveys that fail
to uniformly assess subjects. 4' In addition, current literature is
virtually devoid of any significant longitudinal studies that follow and
evaluate subjects over an extended period of time. 41 Many studies in
this area are retrospective and, therefore, can fall prey to the subjects'
bias in recalling their experiences. 143  Other studies in this field are
correlational, and investigate how two variables adjust in relation to
each other.'44 Standing alone, however, correlational studies cannot
be interpreted as showing which variable caused the effect, and thus
drawing strong conclusions from them may be troublesome. 45
136. Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 98.
137. See id.; Graham-Bermann, supra note 118, at 31.
138. See Peter G. Jaffe & Robert Geffner, Child Custody Disputes and Domestic
Violence: Critical Issues for Mental Health, Social Service, and Legal Professionals, in
Children Exposed, supra note 19, at 371, 376-77.
139. See id.; see also Osofsky, supra note 19, at 97 ("[I]t is often difficult to separate
the different effects of domestic and community violence on children.").
140. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10-11.
141. Id.
142. Id.; Wolak & Finkelhor, supra note 94, at 98 ("No longitudinal studies and
virtually no follow-up studies have been conducted."). But see Johnson, supra note
131, at 82 (describing a longitudinal study involving self-report interviews with
parents and their children, suggesting that drug and alcohol abuse places children at
additional risk for negative effects later in life, and affirming that a possible long-term
effect of witnessing domestic violence is abuse in children's later adult relationships).
143. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 10-11; see also Johnson, supra note
131, at 32 (describing an example of a retrospective study, while also admitting that
"[r]etrospective self-report is subject to recall bias").
144. Johnson, supra note 131, at iii. An example of correlational design is a recent
study in which one set of variables, the level of knowledge about divorce and skill in
dealing with divorce as acquired through divorce education programs, was measured
against another set of variables, the level of domestic violence and parental
communication. Id. at 57. The study indicated that subjects with greater divorce
knowledge and skill had better parental communication and were subjected to less
domestic violence. Id.
145. Id. at iii.
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As a result of the methodological limitations and faulty research
designs of studies assessing the type of exposure to domestic violence
that children experience, the data in this realm is inconsistent.1 For
example, one study indicated that two-thirds of battered women
reported that their child was aware of marital arguments."7 Similarly,
a second study found that most mothers reported that their children
witnessed either the violence or its effects.' " A third study, however,
discovered a much lower rate of exposure to domestic violence-less
than 50%.149 Researchers question the accuracy of such studies given
the limited research in the field and methodological concerns."" They
also are concerned about relying solely on battered mothers as
reporters, who "may deny, minimize, underreport," or simply not
know of their children's exposure to domestic violence.'
Notably, the data also reveals that not all children are negatively
affected by witnessing violence, and some are resilient to any
impairment.52 Irregularities exist, however, regarding exactly how
many children fall into this category. For example, one study
indicated that 60% of children seem to be unaffected by the violence
in their homes.' 53 Other studies found an even wider range, indicating
that between 25% and 70% of witnessing children do exhibit
behavioral problems."
In light of the flawed methodology and inconsistent data
highlighted in the current literature, some researchers suggest
methods of improving the quality of research. In addition to using
comparison groups and doing longitudinal studies, suggestions include
looking at children's individual characteristics, child rearing in violent
146. See Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 5. As one commentator states:
Although numerous researchers have documented an association between
children's exposure to spousal conflict and child maladjustment, the
association between the two factors is not as consistent as one might expect.
Perhaps in part the lack of consistency across studies can be explained by the
methods used to assess spousal conflict and children's exposure to the
conflict.
Sternberg et al., supra note 1142, at 124 (citations omitted).
147. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 5 (citing a 1991 study by Holden &
Ritchie).
148. Id. (citing a 1991 study by Hilton).
149. Id. (citing a 1994 study by O'Keefe).
150. Id
151. Id.; supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
152. Holden Introduction, supra note 93 at 11 ("A relatively high number of
children who are exposed to marital violence exhibit emotional, behavioral, or other
types of problems. Remarkably, at least some of the children from violent homes
seem to survive that experience relatively unscathed ....").
153. Graham-Bermann, supra note 118. at 31: see also id. at 21 (indicating that
abusive families seem to be outside the range of normality, but "[hless clear is just how
much woman abuse interferes with normative child development and in what
particular ways it may harm the developing child").
154. Holden, Parenting Behaviors, supra note 97. at 290.
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homes, and ethnic, age, and gender variables.'55 These researchers
emphasize the need to explore whether a witnessing child's problems
endure over time, if these children respond to crisis intervention or to
a more stable environment, and how chronic exposure to domestic
violence influences a child's development. 5 6 The variation in the
effects of witnessing domestic violence on children, showing that some
children are more resistant to harm than others, demands an
examination of factors that protect children, including adult role
models, community support, and strong mother-child relationships.' 7
Researchers assert that "no single theory or even combination of
theories can explain how children are affected by marital violence."'58
Development of the research in this field is therefore key to clarifying
if, when, and how children are harmed by witnessing domestic
violence. As a Report to the American Bar Association indicated,
"[r]esearch can help increase understanding of how domestic violence
and child abuse [and neglect] are linked and how, if at all, they
interact to create greater dangers to children. Research can track case
outcomes and indicate which policies promote greater safety."' 59
As previously noted, the policy of charging battered mothers with
failure to protect and removing children from their care is a standard
response to domestic violence that is currently utilized in several
states across the country. 160  Researchers, however, warn against
adopting a uniform intervention in light of the conflicting, nascent
research on harm to child witnesses of domestic violence. As one
researcher stated, "[g]iven the variability in children's responses to
spousal violence, it is important to recognize that a single
intervention.., is not likely to address effectively the needs of each
and every child with problems.' 16' Few studies attempt to link
research, social policy, and intervention, 62 but some researchers
encourage a "holistic," family systems approach to intervention.'63
155. George W. Holden et al., Appraisal and Outlook, in Children Exposed, supra
note 19, at 409, 417-19 [hereinafter Holden et al., Appraisal and Outlook]; Holden,
Parenting Behaviors, supra note 97, at 293 ("To date, the research available
concerning child rearing in violent homes is extremely limited.").
156. Holden et al., Appraisal and Outlook, supra note 155, at 411-14; Tomkins et
al., supra note 98, at 154 (indicating that though very few studies exist, some indicate
that clinical intervention may help to reduce both short and long-term consequences
of witnessing the battering of a child's mother).
157. Jaffe & Geffner, supra note 138, at 377.
158. Holden et al., Appraisal and Outlook, supra note 155, at 410.
159. The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: A Report to the President of
the American Bar Association 18 (2d rev. prtg., 1994) [hereinafter The Impact of
Domestic Violence].
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. Ernest N. Jouriles et al., Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Helping Families
Departing from Battered Women's Shelters, in Children Exposed, supra note 19, at
337, 340.
162. Holden, Introduction, supra note 93, at 11.
163. The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 5 (encouraging
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This approach considers family safety and support, and evaluates the
child in conjunction with her caretaker."
By not fully integrating research and intervention considerations,
states may be applying the failure to protect doctrine in a problematic
manner. Examination of the legal reasoning and social science
research underlying the policy of failure to protect, however, raises
the conflict of interests that are embedded in this form of legal
intervention. Clashing interests of the state, the child, and the
battered mother (or the primary caretaker) characterize the debate
regarding the failure to protect policy as applied in states such as New
York.165 As the state charges mothers with failure to protect and
removes children from their care for the benefit of the children, the
mother and child struggle to remain together. Part II explores the
constitutional issues and conflicting interests raised by the application
of failure to protect policy, outlines the constitutional framework used
to analyze the conflict, and describes what is at stake for the parties
entangled in the failure to protect debate.
II. A BATTLE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY-EMBEDDED INTERESTS:
THE CLASHING RIGHTS OF MOTHER, CHILD, AND THE STATE
The policy of charging a battered mother with neglect and removing
a child from her care because the child witnessed domestic violence
presents a situation with three major components. First, according to
the United States Supreme Court, parents have a fundamental right
regarding the care and custody of their children which must be
considered in cases of removal. Second, children also have rights
regarding the parent-child relationship, though the Supreme Court
has defined them more narrowly than parental rights." Third, the
state, via child protective services, initiates the process to remove a
prosecutors to adopt "holistic child and family safety and support" in Family Violence
Units, whereby issues affecting both children and families are addressed (emphasis
omitted)); Jaffe & Geffner, supra note 138, at 377 (urging the consideration of
numerous variables in a context larger than the child, including adult role models,
attachments to mother, and community supports, when assessing the effects of
witnessing domestic violence on a child); Osofsky, supra note 19, at 97-98 ("A systems
approach that takes into account not just the child but the interrelated connections
that link the child and his or her community offers... a useful framework.").
164. See The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 5.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 23-55.
166. See infra Part II.A.
167. See infra Part II.B.; see also Michael Fine, Comment, Where Have All the
Children Gone? Due Process and Judicial Criteria for Removing Children from Their
Parents' Homes in California, 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 125, 141 (1992) ("Though the United
States Supreme Court has spoken in broad terms with respect to parental rights, it has
not done the same with regard to children's rights. Supreme Court pronouncements
with regard to children's rights have been narrower in scope.").
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child when the state identifies a need to protect his or her health,
safety, and/or welfare.'ls
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in
part "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. ' 169 The substantive component
of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that "deprivations of life,
liberty, or property [must] be substantively reasonable."'70 A due
process violation therefore occurs when a state action results in an
unreasonable deprivation of a person's life, liberty, or property rights
without due process of law. 171
If the deprivation relates to a liberty interest, whether that interest
is fundamental to due process also must be considered.'
Governmental action infringing on a non-fundamental right is only
subject to a weak judicial scrutiny test, whereby the state action will
be upheld if it is rationally and reasonably related to a legitimate
government interest. 73  When a fundamental right is involved,
however, the government action is judicially examined by a rigid,
strict scrutiny test which is considerably more difficult to withstand. 74
In these cases, government actions are "subject to a strong
presumption of unconstitutionality" and under the strict scrutiny test,
the government must show a compelling state interest to rebut that
presumption.175
When the state threatens to interfere with parental rights and the
integrity of the family, its policy is judicially scrutinized to prevent
violations of substantive due process. 7 6 In cases of failure to protect,
the state infringes upon a mother's liberty interest in the care and
custody of her child when it removes the child from her.'77 Since she is
deprived of her fundamental right to care for her child,78 the due
process clause is potentially violated. A mother's fundamental right,
however, is not the only interest involved in this complex dynamic-
168. See infra Part II.C. (detailing the role of the state in parent-child relations,
specifically in the context of failure to protect). See generally Mark Hardin, Legal
Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 Wash.
L. Rev. 493, 556 (1988) (describing how state intervention may involve separating a
child from his parents or even terminating parental rights to the parent-child
relationship).
169. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 625, 625 (1992).
171. Id. at 630-32.
172. Id. at 632.
173. Id. at 643.
174. Id. at 638-42.
175. Id. at 638.
176. See Fine, supra note 167, at 141.
177. Galloway, supra note 170, at 631 n.31 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923), as the Supreme Court's confirmation of a broad view of liberty
interest, including an individual's rights to establish a home and raise children).
178. See infra Part II.A.
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both the interests of the state and the rights of the child must also be
considered.
This part examines these three conflicting constitutional interests
and the repercussions of the failure to protect policy on the respective
rights of the battered mother, the child, and the state. These
conflicting interests provide the foundation for effectively addressing
the failure to protect controversy.
A. Battered Mother's Interests in the Parent-Child Relationship
One of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the
Supreme Court is the right of parents to the care, custody, and control
of their children. 79 Substantial precedent has established and re-
affirmed the constitutionality of a parent's right to raise her child by
determining that this is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The failure to protect policy of temporarily removing' children
from the nonviolent mother's care raises a concern that the practice
interferes xvith the mother's fundamental right to the care and custody
of her child.1" There is a developing fear that the battered mother's
rights are being undermined and jeopardized for the actions that she
179. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510,534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390.399 (1923).
180. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2060; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the right[] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's
children." (internal citations omitted)); Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(emphasizing the "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (indicating
that Supreme Court jurisprudence has recognized "broad parental authority over
minor children"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized
on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (-The
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children come[s] to this Court with a momentum for
respect .. " (internal quotation omitted) (citation omitted)); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." (citations
omitted)); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
181. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
182. See Nicholson Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-12 (alleging that
"[s]aid policy, and the removal and detention effectuated pursuant to said polic',
constituted an unlawful interference with plaintiff's liberty interest in the care and
custody of her children, the infant plaintiffs herein, in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution").
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takes, or fails to take, concerning her child.'83 Courts often consider a
mother neglectful or unfit if she fails to leave her batterer or suffers
from Battered Women's Syndrome."s Imposing strict liability on the
battered mother by automatically removing her children labels her as
passive and incapable of leaving an abusive relationship.8 5 A woman,
however, may remain with her batterer for a multitude of reasons:
financial dependency, fear of violence toward herself or her children,
social stigma, unavailability of battered woman shelters, or
apprehension of losing her children to child protective services. 86 In
fact, remaining with her batterer may be a mother's first line of
defense, as the most dangerous period for a battered woman and her
children occurs immediately after leaving the relationship.'
Furthermore, paralyzed by a fear of losing her children to child
protective agencies, a battered mother may refuse to seek services to
help leave her abusive partner. 18
183. See Amy R. Melner, Rights of Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused
Children: Courts' Termination of Battered Women's Parental Rights Due to Failure to
Protect Their Children from Abuse, 7 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 299, 303
(1998); see also The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 14 ("Frequent
attempts to flee an abuser, time spent at a shelter, or the temporary transfer of
custody by domestic violence victims to other family members for the purpose of
protecting their children should not create any presumption of parental negligence.").
184. See Melner, supra note 183, at 303-04; see also supra Part I.A. (discussing the
reasoning of various courts in considering allegedly neglectful mothers). Battered
Women's Syndrome, in particular, "is now well accepted by most professionals
working in the field as well as by many courts who try to understand victims'
behavior." Peter G. Jaffe et al., Children of Battered Women 22 (Developmental
Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry Series Vol. 21, 1990). The syndrome is defined by
one authority as being
marked by a victim's increasing sense of helplessness and hopelessness about
finding safety and terminating the violence. These feelings are reinforced by
a sense of isolation and poor self-esteem, fostered by the batterer. Over
time, victims can begin to deny and minimize the extent of the violence and
underestimate the lethality of the situation for themselves and their children.
Id. (citation omitted).
185. The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 854; Melner, supra
note 183, at 303-04.
186. Melner, supra note 183, at 309-15.
187. The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 858-59 ("Studies
reveal that it is during and after separation that the batterer is most likely to stalk,
harass and even kill the mother.").
188. Id. at 849; Stone & Fialk, supra note 86, at 211 ("Women learn that reporting
violence inevitably leads to the removal of their children from their homes."); see also
Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children:
Understanding the Connections, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1995).
The paradox of society's treatment of battered women is that the word is
'out': if you report domestic violence in your home, your children might be
removed; if you are a child and you make a report, you may be placed in
foster care or a group home.... The paradox of the domestic violence
situation is, therefore, that it often leads to the separation of women and
children.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Courts mistreat battered women in a variety of ways, such as
ignoring the existence of marital violence; using the psychological and
emotional effects of the abuse, such as Battered Women's Syndrome,
against the mother; blaming the mother for her denial or mitigation of
the battering; turning the mother's failure to leave against her; or
insisting that the mother is destined to enter future abusive
relationships.1" Regardless of the reasoning used by the court, failure
to protect charges dominate the outcome, removal of children is the
protocol, and the mother's fundamental rights to the care and custody
of her child are subsequently deprived. Critics of the failure to protect
policy claim that the neglectful battered mother meets the same
consequences as the mother who directly abuses her children,
declaring that this policy renders "the distinction between abuse and
neglect... meaningless.""'
A battered mother's interest in the parent-child relationship is only
one facet of the fierce conflict over the failure to protect doctrine.
The failure to protect policy also involves the child's rights in the
parent-child relationship, as defined by the Supreme Court.
B. Child's Interest in the Parent-Child Relationship
The rights of children are more narrowly defined than those of their
parents, though federal courts have recognized children's
constitutional interest in the parent-child relationship."' While the
Supreme Court has declined to determine "whether a child has a
liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining
her filial relationship,"1" some federal courts maintain that the
integrity of the family includes "the reciprocal rights of both parent
and children."'93  For example, the Second Circuit highlights the
emotional bonds that develop from the daily interaction between
parent and child as a key reason for refusing to "dislocate[]" a child
from his parent."9 Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledges that
189. Melner, supra note 183, at 304; see supra Part I.A.; cf Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents....").
190. Miccio, supra note 13, at 1093.
191. See Fine, supra note 167, at 141-42; see also William Wesley Patton, The World
Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Concurrent Civil and Crininal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 Ga. L Rev. 473, 489
(1990) (stating that children "have a recognized and critical interest in not being
needlessly severed from parental bonds").
192. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
193. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817. 825 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Franz v.
United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The constitutional interest in the
development of parental and filial bonds.., above all ... is manifested in the
reciprocal rights of parent and child to one another's 'companionship."' (citations
omitted)).
194. See Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825 (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
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the child's interest is advanced while in the care of competent
parents, 195 stating "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.' 1 96
Child advocates raise other arguments and suggestions to ensure
that children's reciprocal rights to family integrity are protected. In
particular, they promote individualized consideration of the child's
circumstances whenever an action by child protective services, such as
removal from the home, will alter the child's status within the
family.197 For example, advocates criticized a New York state statute
that presumed a foster parent convicted of a felony was unfit and
mandated removal of the foster child from the parent's care. 198 Citing
Stanley v. Illinois,99 advocates argue that such a statute, which
irrebuttably presumes that the state action protects the child's welfare,
is unconstitutional and a determination based on the individualized
assessment of the child's circumstances is necessary."' 0
The failure to protect doctrine removes children from their
nonviolent mother's care based on the child's right to be free from
abuse and neglect.2 1 Critics of failure to protect policy evaluate the
child's right to be protected from harm and the mother's right to
custody of her child in the context of the reciprocal right to family
integrity shared by both. 2  That is, children cannot be protected
without protecting their caretakers as well, indicating that removal
from the mother's care does little to safeguard the combined rights
Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
195. See Julie Solomon Rappaport, Note, The Legal System's Response to Child
Abuse: A "Shield" for Children or a "Sword" Against the Constitutional Rights of
Parents?, 9 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 257,264-65 (1991).
196. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
197. See Memorandum of Law at 27, 29, In re Anonymous (N.Y. Fam. Ct., Oct. 18,
1999) (No. B7738-40/99) (on file with Fordham Law Review) (indicating that a
"mandatory, non-discretionary removal of children from a long-term familial
relationship" has never been permitted in New York case law without an opportunity
to investigate the specific circumstances of "the placement and the best interests of
the child") [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
198. Id. at 23-27.
199. 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois law that
mandated removal of children from their unmarried father upon the death of their
mother and requiring that parental unfitness be established through individualized
proof). In Stanley, the Supreme Court stated "that the State registers no gain towards
its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents." Id. at
652.
200. Memoranda of Law, supra note 197, at 25-27.
201. See supra Part I.A.; Rappaport, supra note 195, at 264-65.
202. See Nicholson Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 12-13 (stating in part that
"[a]s a result of defendants' actions [removing children from battered mother],
plaintiff and adult class members suffered or will suffer the loss.. . of the custody and
services of their children; the infant plaintiffs [sic] infant class members have suffered
or will suffer the loss of liberty and of the care and guidance of their mother").
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and safety of both mother and child. 23 Rather than remove the child
from the mother, suggestions include removing the batterer from the
home, and developing a safety plan for both mother and child,-" or
maintaining intact families through services to prevent domestic
violence in the home.205
The conflicting rights of mother and child enmeshed in the failure
to protect policy is further complicated by the interests of the state.
States intervene in the family relationship and remove a child from
the battered mother's care in order to prevent a child from witnessing
domestic violence. Although states intervene to protect the best
interests of the child, such state action is still subject to constitutional
scrutiny.
C. State's Interest in the Best Interest of the Child
The Supreme Court has made clear that the State, in its role as
parens patriae,0 6 may encroach on parental rights to protect the well-
being of a child.27 Traditionally, the Supreme Court recognizes that
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parent's children. 2
8
The law presumes that the emotional bonds of the parent-child
relationship prompt the parent to act in the best interest of the
child.2' The State's control over parental rights may be exercised
203. See The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159. at 5.
204. Id. at 17-18 (encouraging child protective services and courts to decline
"pit[ting] battered parents and children against each other" as well as urging the
removal of abusers and the promotion of safety plans for both the battered mother
and her children); Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State:
Children on the Margins, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 8-10 (1995) ("[T]he child
protective system should remove the batterer from the home, and it should support
the battered mother by providing safety plans that will allow her to protect herself
and her children."); Johnson, supra note 21, at 271 ("Fresh from the courtroom and
wielding a new weapon in the war against domestic violence, California prosecutors
have, for the first time, successfully convicted a man for domestic battery based only
upon a child witness' mental suffering.").
205. See Davidson, supra note 86, at 362 ("[Child protective agencies] and courts
should use carefully constructed and thoroughly evaluated risk assessment
instruments. These instruments should include an appraisal of the family's domestic
violence history as well as the present ability of non-abusive parents to keep violence
from erupting in the home.").
206. See Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990)) (defining parens patriae as
"the state as a sovereign"); see also Rappaport, supra note 195, at 264 n.51 (describing
the historical development of parens patriae and identifying this doctrine as the origin
of state intervention into the family).
207. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158. 166-67 (1944).
208. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2061 (2000).
209. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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when the physical or mental health of the child is endangered.2 10 The
Supreme Court does not condone state intervention in all family
integrity cases, but carefully examines abuse and neglect cases where a
parent may be acting against the best interest of his or her child.2 '
Government intervention in the parent-child relationship may be
challenged because mother or child could claim that such state action
deprives them of a protected right in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Furthermore, in any due process claim, the court will
consider whether the right involved is a fundamental right.212
Fundamental rights include the right to privacy,213 freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of association,
or "those rights 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.""'2 4  In these situations, if the government action
"substantially interferes with the exercise of the fundamental right in
question," the intervention is an infringement on the fundamental
right.215 There is no exact test for infringement, and the totality of the
circumstances216 is evaluated to determine whether substantial
interference with a fundamental right has occurred.2 7 If the State did
infringe upon the fundamental right, then the state action is subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.218 Therefore, the court will inquire whether the
government action is necessary, or the only or least burdensome way
to achieve a compelling state interest-a governmental interest of the
highest order.219
The State has a compelling interest when its action is permitted by
the Constitution and its reasons for action are extremely strong.220
The "necessary" component of this test requires that the state action
be the only practical, or least burdensome, means for advancing the
compelling state interest.221 On the other hand, if the state action does
not affect or infringe on a fundamental right, the intervention is only
210. Id. at 603.
211. Id. at 602-03.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 166-70.
213. Galloway, supra note 170, at 633 (indicating that the right of privacy is "by far
the most important fundamental right in substantive due process law" and specifying
that it includes "the right not to be sterilized, the right to choose a marriage partner,
the right to choose family living arrangements, the right to send one's child to
parochial school, the right to have one's child study a foreign language, and the
freedom of intimate association" (citations omitted)).
214. Id. at 635-36 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
33-34 (1973)).
215. Id. at 636.
216. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (describing "totality of
the circumstances" as a legal test whereby "the whole picture ... must be taken into
account").
217. Galloway, supra note 170, at 636.
218. Id. at 637-38.
219. Id. at 638.
220. Id. at 639.
221. Id. at 640-41.
1514 [Vol. 69
FAILURE TO PROTECT
subject to a rationality test,m and the level of judicial inquiry is less
severe than the strict scrutiny test. It merely asks whether the
government action is rationally and reasonably related to a legitimate
government interest.2tm
In the failure to protect context, the State's interest in protecting
children from physical and mental impairment motivates the
governmental action of removal from the battered mother's care.
But, the practice of removal raises constitutional questions. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a parent cannot lawfully be
denied custody of a child without a timely hearing. "4 The standard for
removal, however, varies across jurisdictions and in New York, for
example, a child may be removed from parental custody before a
hearing "where there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that a threat to the child's health or safety is imminent."'' In such
cases, the State's interest in the child's welfare outweighs the parents'
right to a procedural hearing.
The specific removal standards of individual jurisdictions and other
related parental rights aside, failure to protect critics condemn the
policy at a broader level, labeling it faceless, punitive, and
misinterpretive of existing neglect statutes. "  As such, they call into
question the reasonableness of "across the board" removal and the
constitutionality of this type of state intervention.2 7
Failure to protect policy fosters a web of conflicting interests. The
State's interest in the well-being of its children conflicts with a
mother's fundamental right to the care and custody of her child, while
the child's interest in remaining with the mother clashes with the
State's interest. To resolve this conflict, the failure to protect policy
must be re-examined for its appropriateness and constitutionality.
Part III argues that because a substantial body of social science
research questions the extent and likelihood of harm to witnesses of
domestic violence, the failure to protect policy should be reevaluated.
Moreover, uniform removal of children from their battered mothers
may impermissibly infringe on a mother's fundamental rights and
based on the social science research, may not be necessary to further a
compelling state interest.
222. Id. at 643-44.
223. Id. at 643.
224. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
225. Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing the New
York Family Court Act § 1024(a) and case law).
226. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 849-57
(criticizing the strict liability interpretation of New York's neglect statute as
implicating a policy that punishes all battered women without consideration of actions
taken to protect their children).
227. Nicholson Amended Complaint, supra note 1. at 17 ("Declaring that
defendants' policy and/or practice of removing and detaining children from their
mothers, based upon the fact that the mothers are victims of domestic violence, is
unconstitutional.").
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III. BEYOND "COMMON SENSE": A RE-EVALUATION OF
FAILURE TO PROTECT POLICY
"'What is difficult is that you're victimizing them twice,' he said of
the mothers. 'On the other hand, you have the notion of protecting
the children. And they are not necessarily consistent."'22 s In his own
words, Judge Clark T. Richardson of the Bronx Family Court in New
York City acknowledged the conflicting interests present in the failure
to protect dilemma. In the overwhelming majority of failure to
protect cases in his court, he reversed removal decisions and returned
children to their nonviolent mothers.2 9 Judge Richardson recognized
what the case law has revealed: the facts and circumstances
surrounding each family differ widely, the reasoning used by judges is
subjective and variable, and yet in most cases, the policy of removal is
the same.230
This uniform policy applied to all battered mothers is objectionable
on both social science and legal grounds. State intervention into the
privacy of the family in failure to protect cases is the result of judicial
interpretation of various state neglect statutes,231 and as a
governmental action that impinges upon a fundamental liberty
interest, it is subject to scrutiny for its constitutionality. 2 A mother's
fundamental right to the care, custody, and upbringing of her child 3
is infringed upon and deprived by the application of failure to protect
doctrine, and therefore may be unconstitutionally violated.' Under
the totality of the circumstances, when the State removes a battered
woman's child from her home without explanation and takes that
child into the temporary custody of the state, she can no longer
exercise her fundamental right to care for her child. 5 While the law
alone generally provides ample procedural protections to a parent for
temporary removal,z 6 removal according to failure to protect policy
228. Sengupta, supra note 2 ("And so for Judge Richardson... these cases present
an especially daunting exercise in balancing interests.").
229. Id. (indicating that over a six month period, Judge Richardson reversed the
majority of the thirty-five to forty domestic violence-related neglect petitions on his
docket).
230. See id.: see also supra Part I.A. (surveying the application of failure to protect
doctrine in domestic violence cases in the jurisdictions of different states).
231. See supra notes 25, 56, 72, 76 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 212-23 and accompanying text; see also redacted Brief, 21-27
(on file with Fordham Law Review) (arguing that a New York State statute that
mandates removal of foster children from a foster parent based on a prior criminal
conviction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
implicates a fundamental liberty interest and it fails to further a necessary and
compelling state interest).
235. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
236. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 777-81 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(detailing the legal and notice-related steps taken once a child is temporarily removed
from parental custody in New York, including a required petition alleging abuse or
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lacks both standards and reason. As the Supreme Court asserted,
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
'[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest.2 17
Thus, the gravity of the stakes for the battered mother, the
infringement on her fundamental rights, and the indiscriminate
removal in the failure to protect context provide the basis for strictly
scrutinizing this governmental policy.2"
A Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge will
include an analysis of whether the policy is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest. Failure to protect policy is probably
not rooted in a compelling state interest, because social science
research demonstrates the unclear extent and nature of harm to child
witnesses of domestic violence." 9 Even if the state interest is deemed
compelling, however, failure to protect policy is clearly not the only,
necessary means by which a state may protect a child's well-being.
First, the existence of flawed and underdeveloped social science
data concerning child witnesses of domestic violence shows that the
state may not have a compelling interest in removing children from
their nonviolent mothers in all cases. As studies indicate, children are
at high risk of being harmed by witnessing domestic violence, and may
exhibit emotional and behavioral problems as a result.-' ' Despite the
current evidence of short and long-term effects of witnessing domestic
violence, researchers regard these results with caution.2 4' The
shortcomings of this literature, including small sample sizes, lack of
longitudinal studies, and limited exploration of the severity,
chronicity, and type of violence, create uncertainty regarding the
extent of the effects on individual children of witnessing domestic
violence. 42 Given the wide variation of effects24 - and the resilience of
neglect filed with Family Court, prompt service of summons and copy of petition
upon the parents, mandatory fact-finding hearing requiring attendance of parents,
admittance of only relevant evidence at the hearing, and periodic review of temporary
removal orders by the Family Court).
237. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
238. See Galloway, supra note 170, at 638-42 (describing the basic principles of
strict scrutiny); see also supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text (outlining the
different tests of constitutional scrutiny); supra note 234 (explaining Martin
Guggenheim's constitutional challenge of a New York State statute mandating
removal of foster care children from their foster parent).
239. See supra Part I.B.2.
240. See supra Part I.B.2.
241. See supra Part I.B.2.
242. See supra Part I.B.2.
243. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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many children to impairment,'" the interest of the state in preventing
imminent harm to these children is not the same in every case.245 The
variability in the outcomes of child witnesses of domestic violence and
the uncertainty of the cause of any harmful effects qualifies the state's
interest in removing every child from a nonviolent mother and may
not be a valid basis for the continuation of this policy. In fact,
researchers warn against adopting a single policy in dealing with
witnessing children because of the developing research in the field and
the vast differences in current findings.246 The burgeoning social
science data indicates that it is no longer accurate to consider these
children in imminent danger of impairment "as a matter of common
sense."24 7  Common sense clearly does not warrant uniform state
intervention in all cases of domestic violence witnessing; rather, the
need for a well-established, compelling interest on the part of the state
is imperative and in accordance with constitutional precedent.2"
Consideration of the research on child witnessing is an invaluable tool
for determining outcomes in order to develop the most effective and
safest policies.2 49 The state's concern is always warranted when the
mental and physical well-being of a child is in danger,20 but ignoring
the ambiguity of current research in this field threatens "the most
essential and basic aspect of familial privacy-the right of the family
to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome
power of the state."' '
Even assuming that the state has a compelling interest in continuing
the policy of failure to protect, state intervention in the form of
removal is not necessary because it is not the only or least
burdensome means to further this interest. 2 Researchers encourage
the consideration of both the child and mother when developing
strategies for intervention2 3 An array of alternative solutions exists
that preserves both the mother's and the child's rights in this scenario.
In order to preserve a mother's fundamental rights, options other
than mandatory temporary removal of her children may be effective.
Some suggestions include removing the perpetrator of domestic abuse
from the family 4 or terminating the perpetrator's parental rights
when he commits domestic violence in front of his children.255
244. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 54.
248. See supra Part II.C.
249. See supra text accompanying note 159.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
251. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
252. See supra text accompanying note 221.
253. See supra notes 161-63, 202-04 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
255. See Haddix, supra note 23, at 764-800.
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Another alternative codifies an affirmative defense to failure to
protect for battered mothers, as exemplified by states such as Iowa,
Minnesota, and Oklahoma. 6  Enacting safety plans and access to
battered women's services is an additional alternative-a preliminary
attempt to help the battered mother by offering her the chance, which
she desperately needs, to leave her abuser.' ¢ These tactics discourage
labeling a battered woman as a "bad mother," refuse to essentially
punish the victim twice,- and respect her fundamental right to raise
her child.
Moreover, a child's rights to the companionship of parents and to
be free from abuse and neglect can be maintained through ways other
than removal. 9 Courts should recognize that "[I]ike their battered
mothers, children are often... victimized... by the state, whose legal
and child-care bureaucracies too rarely take into account the truths of
the human heart and psyche .... ,21 Unnecessary removal from the
primary caretaker and disruption of the established, emotional bonds
of the family may also jeopardize a child's well-being. -bl Both social
256. See supra notes 864-89 and accompanying text.
257. See The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 18 (indicating that
"[c]ourts and child welfare agencies have an affirmative duty, before removal ...
decisions, to promote the safety of the victim-parent (typically the mother) and her
children"); see also Sengupta, supra note 2 ("Often, she [the mother] may have done
nothing wrong or negligent, but simply lacked the financial or emotional resources to
leave an abusive partner.").
258. See The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 18; see also Dohrn,
supra note 204, at 2 (explaining that when "child neglect or abuse is adjudicated," a
mother may be deemed not "good enough" and "[her] need to survive and to protect
her children, their economic dependency, or their fear of physical violence" may
detrimentally be ignored); Stone & Fialk, supra note 86, at 205-06 ("Too often, the
legal response to violence in the home has been to victimize abused women further by
holding them accountable for their children's exposure to this violence.").
259. See supra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
260. Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims: Children and Domestic Violence, 26
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 775, 787 (2000) (quoting Lenore Walker, Terrifying Love 139-
40 (1989)).
261. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 n.19 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk:" On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 Yale LJ. 645, 649-50 (1977)). It should be recognized that "[clourt or
agency intervention wvithout regard to or over the objection of parents can only serve
to undermine the familial bond which is vital to a child's sense of becoming and being
an adult in his own right." Id.; see also Panko, supra note 10, at 89 (discussing that
upon removal, "[w]hile the children are doubtless safer without the abusive father, it
is less clear that they are better off in foster care than in a single-parent home with
their mother" (quoting Nancy A. Tanck, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal
Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children From Abuse, 1987 Wis. L.
Rev. 659, 684-85)); The "Failure to Protect" Working Group. supra note 8, at 857
(explaining that removal from the nonviolent mother "often has severe and long-
lasting effects on the family" and may re-victimize children by "increasing] (their]
fear of abandonment"); Sengupta, supra note 2 (indicating that when a battered
mother is wvilling to take steps or has taken precautions to extricate the family from
her abuser, Judge Richardson believes "it is unnecessarily harsh to keep their children
in foster care"). Though the effects of removal on children and their experience in
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science researchers and child advocates assert that individual
assessment of a child's circumstances is key to both legal and
therapeutic intervention. 62  The current state of research
demonstrates the need for evaluation of "child variables" including
the age, gender, and intelligence of a child in order to determine the
harm to an individual witness of domestic violence.263 Accordingly,
child advocates encourage the individual determination of a child's
circumstances when a state action that presumes protection of the
child from harm is at issue.26 Otherwise, the constitutionality of the
action is dubious at best.265  Alternatives to removal promote
individualized consideration in order to discern what harm, if any, has
been experienced by a child of domestic violence. For example,
mandating expert testimony by social science professionals during
neglect hearings against battered mothers would promote the goal of
individual evaluation of children. 266  This tactic discourages a
presumption of harm while highlighting the particularized experience
of the child in question. Also, expert testimony educates judges and
clarifies widespread myths about domestic violence.267 Lawyers may
be reluctant to use expert testimony in domestic violence because of
their unfamiliarity with social science literature and their fear that
judges will not apply the literature to their case.268 However, expert
opinion is key in domestic violence cases in determining the effects of
domestic violence on children, 269 explaining victim behavior,270 and
protecting mothers from being charged with neglect in the failure to
protect context.27'
In conjunction with expert testimony, submission of amicus curiae
briefs by social science professionals during failure to protect
the foster care system are beyond the scope of this Note, please see Michele Miller,
Note, Revisiting Poor Joshua: State-Created Danger Theory in the Foster Care Context,
11 Hastings Women's L.J. 243 (2000) for a discussion of this topic.
262. See supra notes 134-35, 197-99 and accompanying text.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
264. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
267. Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil
Cases, 34 Fam. L.Q. 43, 51 (2000) ("[E]xpert opinion critically educates the fact-
finder.").
268. Id. at 4647.
269. Id. at 50-51 ("Experts facilitate custody determinations by offering insight into
the current and potential effects on children in a domestic violence household.").
270. Id. at 49-50 ("Despite some courts' reluctance.... [expert] testimony remains
critical in domestic violence cases to explain victim behavior. The expert must
educate the fact finder regarding the unfathomable dynamics underlying domestic
violence relationships, and the subtle, confusing facts of abuse.").
271. Id. at 51 (describing that a battered mother often confronts a "Catch 22"
whereby reporting domestic abuse may result in loss of custody of her child and
failing to report may label her neglectful for failure to protect her child, and indicating
that in this situation, expert testimony is imperative to educate the court about the
mother's dilemma).
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proceedings may facilitate educating the courts about the effects of
child witnessing of domestic violence. -' In a New Jersey case, State v.
Michaels, Developmental, Social, and Psychological Researchers,
Social Scientists and Scholars submitted a brief about scientific
findings on interviewing child victims of sexual abuse.2  The court in
Michaels relied not only on the holdings of other courts, but also on a
"sufficient consensus... within the academic, professional, and law
enforcement communities" in deciding whether the interviewing
techniques utilized in this particular case were suspect.-" Similar use
of amicus briefs in the failure to protect context may be an effective
means to broaden a court's perspective on the effects of witnessing
domestic violence on children as well as to provide an accurate
knowledge base for the fact-finder.
Another alternative would create court programs that provide
counseling for child witnesses of domestic violence. -7  These types of
curricula are targeted to alleviate the adverse effects of domestic
violence on children's lives, ranging in age from three to seventeen- "
In fact, programs are already in place in Florida and Hawaii, while
Minnesota has initiated a "domestic violence prevention curriculum"
for elementary school grades.2'
Another widespread solution advocated by legal experts and social
scientists alike is the standardized and improved training of child
protective services caseworkers. 28 According to the commissioner of
the Administration for Children's Services in New York City, removal
is "a judgment call on the part of caseworkers."r 9 He further stated,
"I would hope they would make that call only when there's evidence
that the child is in imminent danger. Do we always get it right? I
suspect it doesn't always happen."' In handling such a sensitive
issue, caseworkers must carefully assess each situation on a case by
case basis, and child protective services must issue a protocol for
achieving a uniform, yet non-obtrusive result, tailored to every
battered mother and her child. Training in the investigation of neglect
allegations should focus on whether sufficient cause exists to remove
272. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1373 (NJ. 1994).
273. Id.
274. Id- at 1379.
275. See The Impact of Domestic Violence, supra note 159, at 6-7.
276. Id at 7.
277. Id.
278. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 8, at 867-70
(suggesting a coordinated response by New York City's Administration for Children's
Services for dealing with children in domestic violence cases, advocating for a
domestic violence coordinator for the agency. and emphasizing the need for funding
to adequately train all caseworkers on domestic violence issues).
279. See Sengupta, supra note 2.
280. Id.
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the child, and if so, a means to reunify mother and child should be the
goal of both the courts and child protective services.28'
In order to successfully implement alternatives to removal, it is
imperative that family courts assume the responsibility to initiate
change in failure to protect cases. Courts can transform the current
failure to protect policy by embracing collaboration with social science
professionals, who are necessary to understanding the legal system's
concern with child witnessing of domestic violence.' Collaboration
may include the foregoing solutions, such as expert testimony by
social science professionals, submission of amicus briefs, court-
mandated counseling of children, and improvements in case work.
Without court-initiated collaboration, the perpetuation of failure to
protect policy poses a serious threat to the constitutionally-protected
rights of the family.
CONCLUSION
The "overzealous application"' of neglect law, as manifested in the
failure to protect policy, is unnecessary to achieve a compelling state
interest. The widespread flaws in social science research raise fierce
doubts regarding the harm to child witnesses of domestic violence in
each and every situation where removal occurs. This data minimizes
the compelling interest of the state in intervening in the family, and
subsequently jeopardizing the fundamental right of the battered
mother to raise her child. Even if the state's interest is compelling,
clearly there are other practical alternatives that make removal of
children from their battered mothers unnecessary. Other solutions,
such as counseling, affirmative defenses, family safety plans, and
adequate training of caseworkers, preserve the rights of both the
nonviolent mother and her child in failure to protect situations. As
Judge Clark Richardson emphasized, "I think the worst thing to do at
that point is to remove [a battered mother's] children .... Then that
person has absolutely nothing, nothing to hope for."2"
281. See Nicholson Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18-19.
282. A recent example of related collaborative efforts is evident in the Honolulu
Conference, "Two Systems-One Family, Bringing the Child Abuse and Domestic
Violence Communities Together." See Maxwell, supra note 109, at 33. According to
one commentator, "[flor nearly a year, a multi-disciplinary team of professionals
designed and sponsored a conference intended to develop a stronger and more
effective working relationship between women's rights advocates in the domestic
violence context and child protective advocates." Id. Family courts may benefit from
the fruits of this collaboration, and should be encouraged to adopt similar practices in
order to address more effectively cases involving both domestic violence and child
protective issues.
283. See Sengupta, supra note 2.
284. Id.
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